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 3 
1. Introduction 
The initial approach of the German Army on infantry tactics before 1914 was antiquated at 
best. There are three distinctive attributes which can be applied to the German infantry of 
1914 during the outbreak of First World War and the first engagements in Belgium and 
France: order, discipline and cohesion. Lieutenant Carl Reichmann of the US Army correctly 
formulated in 1893 the common perception of German infantry: “They evidently intend to 
handle their infantry in close lines in the next war. […] They prefer to lose men than to lose 
control of the officers over them.”
1
 
The art of attack from German Infantry and their way of deployment in battle was 
much the result of Prussian experiences in the hundred years prior to the war and are a fine 
example of how battlefield tactics did not succeed in keeping up with technological 
innovation and the necessities of modern warfare. Despite the extensive increase in firepower 
of a regular infantry company due to the mass distribution of magazine rifles holding multiple 
cartridges, machine guns and hand grenades, tactics in the German Army still called for dense 
formations.
2
 The close-order drill of Prussian origin sacrificed flexibility to let company and 
platoon officers and NCO’s gain a loose sense of direct control over their respective units. 
This particularly German approach in infantry tactics was reflected in the drill pamphlet ‘Drill 
Regulations for Infantry’ of 1906, which was one of the last training manuals distributed 
among the officers of Imperial German Army prior to the war. Cohesion in the ‘skirmish 
line’, the German standard attack formation, was granted a higher priority than the needs of 
the individual soldiers to gain full potential of their defensive and offensive capabilities. 
Statements like “Under no circumstances should the cover of individual soldiers be given 
                                                 
1
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higher priority than the unity of the whole formation”
3
 in the ‘Drill Regulations for Infantry’ 
show how much emphasis was given on avoiding to break up the formation, even if it meant 
almost certain death for individual soldiers. Disarray was considered to be the greater evil 
than combat casualties.  
According to the ‘Drill Regulations for Infantry’ of 1906 the infantry attack on 
company level generally consisted of one or more platoons closing in the enemy while the 
other platoons were supposed to give support with continuous rifle fire to suppress enemy 
resistance.
4
 The platoons closing in to the enemy then had to pluck their bayonets onto their 
rifles, followed by a general assault in close combat: “In close proximity to the enemy, 
soldiers should lower their rifles, shout ‘Hurra’ and assault the enemy position”
5
. The 
officer’s order to assault was to be accompanied by the company’s signallers and drummers.
6
 
Furthermore, the ‘Drill Regulations for Infantry’ openly encouraged Officers to seek close 
combat even if combined suppressive fire of both rifles and artillery were not entirely 
successful in their task.
7
 The reliance on close combat engagements, coupled with a very old 
fashioned way of signalling orders, demonstrate the extent of the method obsolescence of 
German infantry tactics. 
While the German approach in infantry tactics still demonstrated some initial 
successes against adversaries who favoured similar dense formations, like the French Army 
for example, it nevertheless quickly showed its downsides against entrenched enemies who 
defended their position with concentrated rifle fire.
8
 Especially in Belgium and Northern 
France in the engagements with the British Expedition Force German infantry tactics 
effectively showed their method obsolescence with their devastating ratio of low territory 
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 5 
gains to high casualty ratings. The British soldiers who held the line in the Ypres salient 
against the German Fourth Army in November 1914 were professionals, many of them 
veterans of the Second Boer War in 1899-1902, who knew what to expect in modern infantry 
warfare, which tactics proved useful and which ones were better discarded.
9
 Even the Prussian 
Guard Corps, alleged elite troops of the German Imperial Army, was not able to shift the 
battle significantly in favour of the German side. As they marched in the standard close-order 
‘skirmish line’ of the German infantry into the fight the Guard soldiers posed as an easy target 
to the battle hardened British sharpshooters and were quickly reduced by concentrated rifle 
fire.
10
 Although the Prussian Guard on the other hand never had a chance to live up to their 
alleged reputation in a modern infantry battle due to the long peace period prior to the war and 
therefore consisted largely of inexperienced soldiers whose only noteworthy characteristic 
was their often aristocratic background, as Bruce Gudmundsson accurately noted, the news of 
their demise at Ypres still was certainly enough to demonstrate the obsolescence of German 
infantry tactics and sufficient in making sure that this message was carried to a large and 
influential audience.
11
 
Although the results of the Second Boer War already showed prior to the First World 
War to a great extent the weaknesses of tight formations in modern warfare to all international 
military observers and even initiated a discussion on infantry tactics in the German Empire, 
the actual impact on German infantry tactics remained almost nonexistent in the end. The 
results of the Russian-Japanese War somewhat mitigated the observations on the Second Boer 
War in the eyes of many traditionalist minded Army officers and, although in complete 
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disregard to the costs of human lives, seemed to acknowledge their support for infantry 
attacks in dense columns.
12
 The Japanese Imperial Army had modelled their infantry tactics 
after the German Drill Regulations and as they came victorious out of the war, German 
officials saw it as proven that the German infantry tactics were successful in the field, paying 
no attention to the fact that the Japanese had modified the skirmish line to a more dispersed 
pattern during the war to decrease their devastating losses.
13
 The German Field Regulations of 
1908 then became a shallow compromise of both the views of modernistic and traditionalistic 
minded officer. The emphasis on a decentralized chain of command on company and platoon 
level in the German Army however granted officers and NCO’s a sense of freedom in regard 
to their final approach on the battlefield.
14
 As a result some German officers who used this 
freedom to have their units deployed in a more loose and dispersed pattern often had better 
results in battle in the beginning of the First World War than those units which were 
commanded entirely ‘by the book’.
15
 Herein in becomes especially clear that the German 
Army lacked consensus to formulate a consistent approach in its infantry tactics, considering 
that the Drill Regulations called for contradicting methods of both unity and cohesion and 
also a somewhat loose approach of early small unit tactics in dispersed formation.
16
 
The British General Sir Ian Hamilton concluded, based on his impressions on modern 
warfare in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, that “the greater and prouder an army may be, 
the more immovably it stands rooted in its own conservatism, so that it becomes at last 
absolutely incapable (as a body) of incorporating the experiences of others. Thus it comes that 
your military attaches may discover points of training and efficiency of the most vital 
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importance, and the bulk of their brother officers pay no more attention to them”
17
. The 
insufficient pre-war tactics which failed to grasp the reality of the modern battlefield, 
combined with heavy casualties German troops and the alleged elite of the Prussian Guard in 
particular suffered at the Western Front, catalysed efforts within the German Army to finally 
reshape its approach on infantry tactics on basis of battlefield experience, an remedial action 
which had been largely ignored for so long due to the stubborn conservatism within the 
Army’s command.
18
 “The experiences in war […] show that bullets quickly write a new 
tactics, that bullets make short work of obsolete formations and create new ones. But at what 
cost! In the Franco-Prussian War superior leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay 
the price. At the outbreak of war the usual custom is to prepare troops, that have been trained 
under obsolete regulations, for fighting on a strange theater of war by certain ‘Field Service 
Regulations’”
19
, the German Leutnant-General William Balck accurately stated shortly after 
the First World War had ended. 
The failure of the ‘Drill Regulations for Infantry’ of 1906 and their following update 
in the German Field Regulations of 1908 however did not initiate a complete revision of 
infantry tactics in the German Army, but lead to a series of tests which were designed to 
deploy a more streamlined new version of elite infantry which was supposed to be capable to 
meet the demands of the modern battlefield and trench warfare. As large numbers of troops 
were needed at the fronts and at garrison duties in the German-occupied territories across the 
war theatre in Europe, conducting small tests with a limited number of troops remained the 
only method the German Army could afford without seriously endangering the ongoing war 
efforts. The origin of this process lies arguably in the accidental creation of the decentralised 
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command structure, essentially a ‘laissez faire’ stance on small unit infantry tactics, which 
was first promoted in the German Field Regulations of 1908 due to the mentioned lack of 
consensus in the higher echelons of the army on how to judge the results of the Second Boer 
War and the Russo-Japanese War. 
The result of this process was a new type of specialized assault infantry which were 
later during the war commonly referred to as ‘Sturmtruppen’ (lit. ‘storm troopers’ or ‘assault 
troops’) or ‘Stoßtruppen’ (‘shock troops’). The first Assault Detachment of the German Army 
was created by Major Calsow of the German Eighth Army in March 1915 on basis of a 
pioneer battalion which were considered to have the most suitable equipment and training for 
trench warfare.
20
 Calsow was soon relieved of this duty in August of the same year by 
Hauptmann Wilhelm Rohr when his first prototype detachment did not meet the expectations 
of his superiors in combat.
21
 Rohr on the other hand, a professional soldier of the ‘Garde-
Schützen-Bataillon’ (‘Guard Rifle Battalion’) in which in commanded a company and 
participant in the failed infantry operations in the Ypres salient during the first year of the 
war, was by his personal experiences familiar with the shortcomings of the German infantry 
tactics. As his original unit was a light infantry battalion which already practiced a doctrine 
that demanded greater individual initiative and pursued an attack formation in a more 
dispersed pattern than regular infantry, he was able to combine his expertise with the pioneer-
based detachment his predecessor Major Calsow had already formed.
22
 During the course of 
the training Hauptmann Wilhelm Rohr’s ‘Sturmabteilung Rohr’ (‘Storm/Assault Detachment 
Rohr’) tested numerous tactics and was able to prove its effectiveness during the Battle of 
Verdun in 1916.
23
 After the battle it subsequently became the prototype of many more storm 
trooper formations to follow, drawn from the most able soldiers of ‘Jäger’ (lit. ‘hunter’, ‘light 
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infantry’) battalions which were then retrained by seasoned storm troopers of the 
‘Sturmabteilung Rohr’ to fit into their new role as assault infantry.
24
 Since their founder 
Wilhelm Rohr was a former member of the Guard and the storm battalions were modelled to 
be a means to turn the war in Germany’s favour, storm troopers readily gained the reputation 
of being the German Army’s new elite force, her alleged skilled and proud craftsmen of war.
25
  
The Canadian militia and its contribution to the war in Europe, the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force (CEF), on the other hand were completely different in almost every 
regard in comparison to the Imperial German Army. Canada, a nation with a relatively non-
militaristic culture within the British Empire, had prior to the outbreak of the First World War 
only a few men to call upon. The permanent force of the militia consisted of only 5.000 men 
in total between 1904 and 1913. If deemed necessary by the Canadian government this active 
force could be strengthened by additional non active militia forces: Each year up to 55.000 
men underwent basic militia training.
26
 The meagre peacetime participation in the voluntary 
service from a total population of roughly 5 millions shows that the majority of Canadians 
considered military training, at least in the absence of war, of no importance.
27
 In comparison 
to the standing armies of the major European powers the Canadian contribution to the Army 
of the British Empire seemed almost absurdly small. Geographical wise Canada was situated 
in the early 20
th
 century in a relatively peaceful part of the world. Its embedment in the British 
Empire also provided a sense of security for the Canadian society and allowed for the creation 
of only a small armed force to guard her borders. Widespread enthusiasm in rifle shooting 
though resulted in the creation of many civilian rifle associations in all of Canada’s provinces 
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and helped to deliver at least basic skills in the maintenance and usage of firearms to a greater 
part of the Canadian population.
28
 
Canada’s only neighbour on the continent, the United States of America, found the 
Canadian defensive capabilities unimpressive and measured her potential in war only on basis 
of her ally Great Britain. In 1888 the American politician Benjamin Butler pondered the 
possibility of a war between the United States and Great Britain in his published article 
‘Defenseless [sic] Canada’ and concluded that Canadians were mediocre at best as opponents: 
“Hers is not a war-like people. Her peasantry do not take readily to war either by sea or land. 
Her enlistments for land service are not the most creditable nor produce large result.”
29
  
Interestingly enough many Canadians largely shared the American view in their 
characterization, although they tended to put it naturally in slightly more positive light. The 
Canadian historian George Stanley described his countrymen as “Essentially a civilian people, 
an unmilitary people, they have, through historical necessity, fought to preserve their freedom 
and their identity. […] no men have fought better; no men have as quickly discarded the skills 
of war for the farms and factories of peace.”
30
 It is perhaps one of the most striking facts of 
the Canadian military history in the First World War that the army of such a distant and 
seemingly unwarlike society would be the first nation to deploy an innovative and effective 
infantry tactic in attritional warfare. 
The official infantry tactics Canada practiced in her militia prior to her involvement in 
the First World War however had a strong leaning towards firing drills and helping recruits 
adjusting the sights of their rifles and taking correct aim even when they did not possess a 
strong eyesight, including teaching methods of aiming in strong wind.
31
 The Canadian 
infantry drill seemed in this regard better suited for the modern battlefield with their strong 
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emphasis on firing training in contrast to the German pre-war tactics which favoured a 
distinctive prominent role of the bayonet in comparison. However, the Canadian militia still 
considered volley firing drills in the end of the 19
th
 century an effective method of directing 
fire in warfare. The manual on firing and bayonet exercises of 1894 claimed that 
“Experiments have shown that […] a succession of volleys is more effective than an equal 
number of shots fired individually. […]. For these reasons volley firing is continued in the 
attack as long as possible, and in order to give full effect on the power of the rifle […] section 
leaders should be thoroughly trained, and constantly practised in the control of fire”
32
. 
However, it remains debatable how much of an impact these drills had on the Canadian 
soldiery as most of them underwent only a short annual training and were therefore not as 
thoroughly trained in their army’s rather old fashioned firing drills. The Canadians had only a 
comparatively small exposure to military training in their life, very much in contrast to the 
German infantry, which was largely based on conscripts in usually two years of national 
service according to the statutes of April 15
th
 1905.
33
 In comparison to the German Army the 
Canadian militia likely was rather amateurishly drilled and less disciplined. This argument 
gets further proof in regard to Canada’s alleged infantry formations in combat, although the 
official drill manuals of the Canadian militia do not extensively address the question on pre-
war attack formations. There is however a small reference to this particular subject which 
mentions infantry should be deployed in either a single line or divided into smaller sections, 
but no information on how much space each soldiers were supposed to keep from each 
other.
34
 Considering that Canada favoured volley firing, at least in their drills, officers who 
commanded ‘by the book’ likely tried to keep their troops in close order to direct their fire. In 
regard to Canada’s involvement in the Second Boer War there is however no proof that the 
Canadians ever used volley firing drills in conjunction with a tight, cohesive formation in 
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actual combat. As combat service would show these shortcomings in drill actually proved 
helpful to the Canadians as they were less prone to cohesively stick to outdated tactics and 
rather tried to adapt to the situation all by themselves. 
Canada dispatched a small contingent of her militia to aid her British allies in South 
Africa in 1899, although the British Army did not regard the Canadian militia a considerably 
effective fighting force and considered their contribution to the war at first more symbolic in 
its nature to demonstrate solidarity among allies than an actual means to win the war.
35
 For 
Canada the Second Boer War was considered and ideal opportunity to gain international 
recognition, due to the fact that Canada was a relatively new dominion within the British 
Empire and had gained her independence in 1867.
36
 As such the Canadian troops were at first 
not intended to be used in combat and were only on garrison duty in South Africa, until three 
separate British formations suffered a disastrous defeat in December 1899 and the Canadian 
contingent suddenly quickly rose in significance for the British war effort.
37
 The Second Boer 
War therefore became the first major involvement of Canadian infantry on a modern 
battlefield. Initially the Canadian soldiers suffered from similar tactical errors like their 
British allies. The bayonet charge in the battle at Paardeberg Drift on 18
th
 February 1900 
against concealed Boer marksmen which had themselves carefully deployed over the area 
resulted in the death of many Canadians, who did not even know from which direction most 
of the Boer rifle fire was coming.
38
 As the battle continued however the Canadians quickly 
abandoned their initial tactic and adopted the Boer approach in infantry tactics. The well 
staged and executed fire fight between the Canadian and Boer soldiers at Paardeberg 
subsequently managed to pin the Boer forces down in their trenches and, with no way to 
                                                 
35
 Schull, Joseph, Laurier: The First Canadian (Toronto, McMillan of Canada, 1965), pp. 381. 
36
 Rich, E., ‘Canadian History’ in The Historical Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1971), pp. 849. 
37
 Horn, Colonel Bernd, ‘Accidental Heroes: The “Royal Canadians“ Redeem British Honour at Paardeberg’ in 
Show no Fear: Daring Actions in Canadian Military History, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Omer Lavoie (Toronto, Dundurn Press, 2008), pp. 213-214.   
38
 Ibid. pp. 223-224. 
 13 
retreat, led to their unconditional surrender.
39
 The Canadian forces as a result achieved the 
first major British victory in the Second Boer War. As the war in South Africa progressed 
Canadian casualties remained very low. According to the Canadian Captain Ernest Chambers 
only 65 Canadian soldiers were killed in combat in the three years of war out of 7.349 officers 
and men of the contingent who served in South Africa.
40
 
The adaptability Canadian troops showed during their involvement in the Second Boer 
War would become one of their most distinctive traits and would greatly contribute to their 
approach in specialised infantry tactics in the First World War. Furthermore it showed that 
Canadian troops at the front line in a war were ready to neglect the lessons of their pre war 
training in certain circumstances in favour of own methods.
41
 The idea of trench raiding in the 
First World War in this regard was again an ad hoc development during the beginning of 
trench warfare on the Western front, supported by the amateurish nature of the Canadian 
Expedition Force which encouraged her frontline soldiers to formulate their own tactics 
according to the change from mobile to attritional warfare. Since their leaders rather stack to 
British oriented drill regulations, impulses in tactical innovation were essentially left to basic 
infantrymen in the field.  
The Canadian infantry initiated trench raids as early as February 1915, almost 
immediately with the introduction of trench warfare on the Western Front.
42
 Although trench 
raiding was not a method which was only practiced by the Canadian Expedition Corps, the 
Canadians however were the first to deploy it. Other nations only followed their example. 
“Trench raids would probably come under the heading of trench annoyance and were first 
instituted by the Canadians, who achieved so much success in this form of harassing the 
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enemy that the operation orders used by them were copied by all the Allies”
43
, Captain Haws 
Elliot of the British Expeditionary Force stated in his handbook on trench fighting. 
Development by adaptation however also had its downsides. Canadian losses during the first 
year of the war were extremely heavy due to the fact that the soldiers of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force overall had not found a way yet on how to fight effectively.
44
 To develop 
trench raiding Canadian forces essentially favoured an almost Darwinist ‘survival of the 
fittest’ approach to find out which tactics could be suitable on the battlefields in France and 
showed frequently a tendency to ignore orders from their superiors when they did not fit with 
their fighting style.
45
 
The results of these findings strongly confirm the differences of how both storm 
battalions and Canadian trench raiders came into existence. While storm battalions were the 
result of an orderly development of the German Army, based on the experiences of the battles 
in the years 1914 and 1915, trench raiding on the other hand was an ad hoc adoption of front 
line soldiers to the stalemate of attritional warfare. It also certainly had effects on the self-
perception of the new storm troopers they their ‘founder’ Wilhelm Rohr was a former 
member of a German Guard battalion. Since the guard had failed in battle and could not live 
up to its alleged reputation, it effectively made way for another formation to take over its 
suspected role as an elite force.  
As this thesis will show, the armies of Canada and Germany had at least in their first 
steps a strong similarity in their initial aim to formulate a suitable infantry tactic in the 
ongoing trench and attritional warfare. However Germany’s storm troopers were the result of 
a comparatively sophisticated and technologically advanced army of a highly militarised 
society whereas the Canadian trench raiders were deployed by one of Britain’s dominions 
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which up to the beginning of the First World War never had a strong emphasis on its military 
and had its national defence based on a small militia. The most distinctive observation on 
central traits of both forces is that both had formulated a decentralised command structure in 
the lower echelons in their army’s rank structure which arguably led to a promotion of 
innovation immediately at the frontlines, providing both armies with ad hoc solutions to come 
up against the stalemate of trench warfare where other armies failed to adapt adequately in 
short order. While the decentralised command structure was already a pre-war innovation in 
the German Army which had accidentally resulted from a conflict of opinions in Germany’s 
pre war drills and the initial creation of the storm trooper battalions can be attributed to a 
single person, Wilhelm Rohr, the Canadian trench raiders however were a result of the rather 
amateurish nature of the Canadian Army as a whole which actually subsequently proved to be 
one of the greatest advantages to her soldiers. The comparatively lax stance in the pre war 
Canadian militia on a thorough drill and coherent discipline gave her troops ultimately the 
freedom to adapt to the battle all by themselves instead of showing obedience to outdated 
tactics like the ones the German infantry entered the war with. However, as the Canadian 
trench raiders were not recognized as much in their importance in trench warfare by their 
superior officers in the British and Canadian General Staff as their counterpart in the German 
Army, they ultimately lacked the institutional support to evolve beyond their roots. Trench 
raiders were essentially left on their own in terms of assault equipment, selection of personnel 
and their approach in infantry tactics which then led to a distinctive diversity in their 
formations. 
To date there has been extensive research conducted on German storm troopers. Ex-
servicemen who fought in the storm trooper formations the second half of the war like Ernst 
Jünger contributed much to the storm troopers renown by publishing their war diaries to a 
broad international audience. ‘Infanterie greift an’ (‘Infantry attacks’) from the future 
Wehrmacht Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, which primarily dealt with his wartime 
 16 
experiences as an infantry officer but also shared considerations for new tactical approaches, 
also became a popular publication in the interwar period.
46
 However, as this research will 
only deal with the storm troopers on the Western Front of the war and Rommel was primarily 
involved in the fights on other fronts, his work will not be considered as a primary source for 
this dissertation. Moreover both Jünger’s and Rommel’s works were distinctively influenced 
by the political views of their authors. While Jünger’s war diary can still serve as a source to 
give a brief impression of storm troopers on a battlefield, it is however rather unreliable to 
carve out their fighting methods as Jünger illustrated his performance and those of his soldiers 
in an almost exclusively positive light. Another example of a prominent storm trooper is 
Ludwig Renn who made a career as a writer in the inter war and post wars period and was 
involved in German communist movements. In his book ‘Krieg’ (‘war’), based on his war 
diary, he deals with his war experiences on the Western Front. He occupies a very dystopian 
and anti war stance in his work, very much in contrast to Jünger and Rommel, who both share 
cases of individual heroism with their audience and to a degree stress a social Darwinist 
‘survival of the fittest’ view on alleged positive effects of war on a nation and its society.
47
 
Primary sources like official documents and records from the German Army on small 
unit tactics and storm troopers in particular are on the other hand very scarce. The destruction 
of the Reichsarchiv during the last month of the Second World War led to the loss of the 
majority of documents on the German Army in First World War. Many primary sources, 
which have been cited in dissertations and other publications in the interwar period, are not 
available anymore. Although there could be still a number of documents in German archives, 
this research is however limited by the fact that its author was not able to visit them but had to 
concentrate on publicly available sources in the United Kingdom and on the internet. 
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Secondary sources though are substantial and more detailed than on the subject on 
Canadian trench raiders. The German interwar Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic as well as 
the Wehrmacht quickly acknowledged the advantages of storm trooper tactics and tried to 
integrate them in their tactical considerations. As storm trooper tactics were subsequently 
essentially deployed by Germany in the Second World War to great success during the first 
years of the war due to the fact that they perfectly fitted into the ‘Blitzkrieg’ doctrine, German 
modern small unit tactics created a considerable international interest in the second half of the 
20
th
 century.
48
 Notable secondary sources on the subject of the history of specialized German 
assault infantry are ‘Stormtroop Tactic’ from Bruce Gudmundsson which is arguably the most 
detailed  existing post-war research on storm troopers, and ‘Doctrine and Dogma’ from 
Martin Samuels which is essentially a comparative study of German and British infantry 
tactics in the First World War. 
There has been so far only little attention been paid to the Canadian contribution to the 
field of development of modern infantry tactics, despite the fact that both formations were 
created at roughly the same time in the exact same war on the two opposing sides of one front. 
As military historians and army officials in the first half of the 20
th
 century often judged the 
power and efficiency of an army’s infantry on their professionalism and exposure to regular 
extensive drill and training, the Canadian Expedition Force in the First World War was 
largely ignored as it was essentially an army of amateur soldier citizens. Not even Canadian 
officials themselves paid much attention to their prominent ad hoc developments in infantry 
tactics.  
The Canadian Expedition Force was quickly disbanded after the war and the Canadian 
militia was reduced to her peacetime strength again.
49
 An extensive debate on tactics for a 
future war however did not occur in Canada like it was the case in the major European 
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powers. The Canadian society once again showed in this regard its rather unmilitary-minded 
stance. It took another World War, the beginning of the Cold War and Canada’s integration 
into the Western NATO alliance to spark a noticeable interest within Canada in her own 
military history.  The military historian Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson was among the first who 
published in 1962 a detailed research on Canada’s involvement in the First World War. In the 
following decades his work was subsequently supplemented by more studies on Canadian 
equipment and tactics by authors like Bill Rawling and Colonel Bernd Horn, as well as a 
growing number of studies which focus on Canadian military history as a whole from its roots 
as a small militia within the British Empire to a modern standing army of professionals in the 
present. Due to its late start the combined amount of research which has been conducted on 
the Canadian Expedition Force is still comparatively small. Furthermore, the topic of trench 
raiding has only been addressed by very few studies so far as most authors seem to favour to 
address the CEF as a whole instead of focusing on a specific branch. Only one article exists so 
far, published in 2008 by the Canadian historian Andrew Godefroy, which deals exclusively 
on the subject of the Canadian trench raiders and gives a brief account of their history and 
their tasks during the First World War. Another Canadian historian by the name Tim Cook 
also published a few articles on trench raiders, but largely concentrates on a few selected 
battles instead of the history of the formation as a whole.  
The aim of this research is to examine how the overall concept of both German storm 
troopers and Canadian trench raiders as specialized assault units influenced the self-
perception of their respective personnel and simultaneously address the question if they were 
perceived differently or identical by others. Following this intention this research will address 
on how aspects of their force structure, standards and methods in the selection of personnel, 
battlefield tactics and institutional support helped or ultimately prevented both formations to 
develop a distinctive esprit de corps. The core hypothesis of this research is that an unmilitary 
minded society with an comparatively neglected armed force made of amateurs could achieve 
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through adaptability and an somewhat accidental decentralised command structure due to 
lower standards in drill similar results in its infantry tactics like an heavily institutionalised 
and both politically and publicly supported army from a society in which service in the armed 
forces was considered mandatory by law and social pressure. Although the development of 
both formations went different routes throughout the war, their initial aim to formulate an 
adequate approach to break the stalemate of trench warfare and give an army an edge in the 
ongoing attritional fighting was very much identical, a distinctive progress for two countries 
which basically shared no other strong similarities in their military. However, despite some 
striking similarities in both formations, this research will show why the German storm 
troopers could develop a self-perception as an elite force in the German Army while Canadian 
trench raiders failed to do so.  
The structure of this study will be oriented on the factors stated above. The first 
chapter will deal with the influence of the force structure and personnel selection on the 
perception of both formations. The second chapter will address the effects on their tactics on 
the same subject as will the third and last chapter which will highlight the results of the 
amount and type of institutional support storm battalions and trench raiders received from 
their respective army and their country’s War Ministry and arms industry.  
 
 
2. Force Structure and Selection of Personnel 
Throughout the year 1916 the ‘Sturmabteilung Rohr’ remained a rather small infantry 
formation for the purpose of testing new infantry tactics in conjunction with suitable assault 
equipment on the battlefield. This process remained unnoticed by the Entente powers despite 
the fact that Wilhelm Rohr had sent his storm troopers into the Battle of Verdun.
50
 In the end 
the decision to use Rohr’s creation as a template for the deployment of larger 
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‘Sturmbattalione’ (‘storm battalions’) alerted the allies of their existence. The Canadian 
Expedition Corps was actually the first among the Western allies to become aware of the new 
German invention in infantry warfare. It wouldn’t be surprising if Canadian trench raiders had 
acquired the information of the existence of the storm troopers during one of their raids on the 
German frontlines due to the fact that gathering intelligence was among others one of their 
main tasks. Available records however don’t attribute this acquired information to a certain 
Canadian unit, so this claim cannot be proven with certainty. Existing records and documents 
of the German Army in the First World War do not cover this particular subject, which as a 
result means that the Canadian intelligence report is actually the only way to recreate a basic 
understanding of a storm battalion’s force structure. 
According to the intelligence report in one of the war diaries from 16
th
 June 1917 of 
the Canadian General Staff the idea of forming storm battalions originated in 1916 on behalf 
of Wilhelm Rohr, which essentially proves that the captured documents contained correct 
information:  
“A document captured during our recent operations gives the following information. 
STURM BATTALION (Attacking Battalion). 
 In May 1916 the idea of such a unit was first discussed and STURM BATTALION 
ROHR was formed. In December 1916 each army formed a storm battalion”.
51
 
‘Abteilung’ (‘detachment’) had obviously been wrongly translated with ‘battalion’ in 
regard to the formation under command of Wilhelm Rohr, which never actually reached 
battalion size during its first deployment phase in 1916. Also the document makes a brief 
distinction between storm troopers and ‘Stosstruppen’ which it sees as a separate and pure 
counterattacking unit, even though both names described in reality the very same troops.
52
 
Despite these small flaws however, which were most likely the result of an inadequate 
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translation, the rest of the information given seems perfectly accurate. From the data provided 
in the intelligence report we can see that an average storm battalion consisted of four 
companies, a light artillery battery and one flamethrower platoon: 
“Composition: 
 2  Infantry storm companies. 
 1  Machine Gun Company. 
 1  Trench Mortar Company. 
1  Forward battery – Infanterie Geschütz Batterie – equals literally Infantry Gun  
Battery. 
 1  Flame projector platoon.”
53
 
This composition is also somewhat confirmed by an article of a former storm trooper 
officer published in 1932.
54
 Although storm trooper tactics were usually described as being 
infiltration tactics, the composition of their battalions very much reflects the basic idea of an 
early approach in combined arms.
55
 A storm trooper battalion basically consisted of all 
military branches and weaponry which had been proven useful in trench warfare, with the 
absence of mechanized formations and direct ground support from airplanes being the only 
characteristics in which it differs from a modern perspective of combined arms from the 
second half of the 20
th
 century.
56
  
Storm troopers often considered themselves to be a superior elite force in comparison 
to regular infantry. Especially former storm troopers like Ernst Jünger frequently described at 
length the reputedly extraordinary abilities of his platoon: “The only satisfaction I took from 
the whole event was from the way the storm troops comported themselves […]. They were a 
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new breed of fighter so far as I was concerned, the volunteers of 1918: still raw, but 
instinctively brave. Those young dashers with long hair and puttees would start quarrelling 
among themselves twenty yards in front of the enemy because one had called the other a 
scaredy-cat, and yet they all swore like troopers and threw their weight around no end. 
‘Christ, we’re not all such funks as you are!’ yelled one, and rolled up another fifty yards of 
trench single-handed”
57
 and “we might be crushed, but surely we could not be defeated. In 
such moments, the human spirit triumphs over the most powerful manifestations of matter. By 
steeled will alone the frail body withstands the most terrible storm”
58
. Although the 
objectivity of Jünger’s war memoir remains very questionable and is without any doubt 
colored by his political beliefs in its first editions, it still provides a distinctive account of a 
storm trooper’s sense of self.  
Storm troopers however were most likely never intended to be an alleged elite force 
within the German Army like for example the German Imperial Guard. Since storm troop 
tactics became essentially a template for German infantry drills in the inter war period, their 
true purpose has therefore possibly always been to replace most non-storm trooper infantry 
formations in the long run. As outlined in the previous chapter, especially Jäger formations 
were to be dissolved and retrained to storm troopers. They were not only suitable for this job 
due to their previous training and configuration but they were also quite numerous within the 
Germany army.
59
 This is also reflected in the choice of personnel for the deployment of a 
storm trooper battalion. Although the initial detachment of Wilhelm Rohr consisted of 
handpicked soldiers who had volunteered for the new assault detachment and had to fulfil a 
high criterion of physical robustness, recruitment standards on the other quickly dropped with 
the mass deployment storm battalions in the course of the year 1917 for the planned spring 
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offensive in 1918.
60
 Especially on the Western Front seasoned veterans with high physically 
fitness had become scarce after the Battle of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme, the so 
called “muddy grave of the German field army”
61
, had inflicted irreplaceable casualties to the 
German Army and had cost many of the best German soldiers their life.
62
 The failure of the 
German spring offensive and the following armistice in late 1918 however ended the 
transformation process to reshape the German infantry in the image of the storm troopers.
63
 It 
is perhaps one of the most astounding results of the war that its untimely end subsequently 
helped the storm troopers to retain their self image as an elite force. It remains debatable 
though whether storm troopers had knowledge of the planned transformation of the army as a 
whole. However even if they did, it did not prevent them from perceiving themselves as an 
elite.
64
 
Thorough training still remained an essential part of a storm troopers life within a 
storm battalion, even if recruiting standards may have continuously lowered during the war.
65
 
Especially Ludwig Renn highlighted in his war memoirs that the storm battalions were 
consistently training different attack patterns in dummy entrenchments behind the frontline to 
thoroughly strengthen their abilities in assaulting enemy entrenchments and getting rid of 
obstacles in their way. “We had to carry machine guns and throw hand grenades, 
proceed in ditches and crawl silently. Initially, it strained me very much. I was sweating 
constantly and the environment faded away a few times before my eyes, but only for a short 
time. Then it was easier for me daily. The service went from morning to evening, with only 
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two or three hours lunch break. I had no time to think and felt comfortable”
66
, he described his 
daily duties after he was ordered to join a storm battalion in 1917. Worth mentioning is also 
an immediate reaction from a soldier of his previous unit, who stated that Renn would have a 
better life in the storm battalion since those were spared from the usual trench duties.
67
 
Although Ludwig Renn never openly perceived himself as an elite soldiers in his war memoir, 
the regular infantrymen he encountered certainly looked up to the storm battalions in a mix of 
envy and awe. 
Following Renn’s description this constant training did seem to somewhat mitigate the 
effects of the lowered recruiting standards. Furthermore, considering Jünger’s remarks on the 
performance of the new young storm troopers which were added to his platoon during the 
German spring offensive of 1918, the new recruits do not seem to be noticeably less skilful in 
his view than those storm troopers he fought alongside earlier. Although he detected their 
rather limited experience they seemed to make it up with a remarkable boldness against the 
odds they faced in combat.
68
 However, as Jünger frequently boasted his own alleged 
outstanding performance in his war memoirs, the overly positive description of the young and 
inexperienced late war storm troopers could also easily be interpreted as a means to retain the 
supposed reputation as an elite force. The intention behind releasing his war memoirs to a 
broad audience was to gain recognition for his sake and his fellow storm troopers after all.
69
 
On the other hand the ratio of combat casualties inflicted and received during the last two year 
of the war was still very much in favour of the German Army.
70
 The new storm battalions and 
their thorough training methods therefore may have had an impact on the overall fighting 
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performance of the German Army and somewhat mitigated the effects of the lower 
recruitment standards. 
It seems that there were no more recruitment criterions applied to the storm battalions 
apart from an at least higher than average physical fitness. There is no indication that social 
standing, nobility and religion of the recruits were put into consideration in the selection 
process. Although a fellow storm trooper in Ludwig Renn’s battalion highlighted that his 
family was proud of him to have made officer rank in a storm battalion because he would 
have been not considered if the pre war peacetime recruitment standards would have been 
applied, it remains unclear which of the mentioned traits would have excluded him.
71
 This one 
example is furthermore not enough prove to substantiate the claim that always only physical 
fitness was considered. However it certainly can be seen as a case in which it was the only 
determining factor.  
The composition of troops in a trench raid conducted by Canadian forces on the other 
hand is difficult to outline. Raiding parties were deployed as ad hoc solutions with the 
beginning of trench warfare and remained as such during the entire course of the war. In this 
respect they were not deployed as a permanent special assault unit like storm troopers and 
separated from the regular infantry. A raiding party evolved entirely in respect to its objective 
in accordance to the perception of their respective commanders in regard to the enemy 
trenches and the expected resistance they assumed to face. As a result the composition of 
raiding parties was very diverse and could consist of a single platoon up to an assault of 
several companies at once. The Canadian historian Andrew Godefroy, who has up to this date 
provided one of the most insightful articles on Canadian trench raids, claims that a Canadian 
raiding party consisted of 5 officers accompanied by 85 men and supported by a reserve of 
another 23 soldiers.
72
 However he fails to provide any sources for his statement. In fact it 
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remains entirely unclear where he found these numbers and which source made him conclude 
that a raiding party always had this strength in manpower. According to the information given 
in a published war memoir of an American volunteer who served in the Canadian Expedition 
Corps, a certain trench raid conducted in Belgium in which he participated in June 1916 
consisted of only sixty soldiers.
73
 Another trench raid which was conducted on 17
th
 January 
1917 prior to the Battle of Vimy Ridge consisted of 860 soldiers which were drawn from 
different battalions and put together for the operation.
74
 Also there were some raids initiated 
during the war in the Canadian sector which had no more than ten participants.
75
 In this regard 
the numbers Andrew Godefroy provided can not possibly be upheld. Furthermore, since 
numbers of participating soldiers in trench raids heavily fluctuated in accordance to the size of 
their chosen segment in the enemy trench system and its garrison, it is as a result impossible 
to attach a strict form of organisation to them like it can be done with the storm battalions. 
Raiding parties usually consisted entirely of volunteers. However, as Sergeant 
McClintock of the 87
th
 Canadian Grenadier Guard Battalion stated, it often occurred that an 
entire battalion volunteered for the mission and officers then handpicked the soldiers they 
wanted to participate: “After we had been on the front line fifteen days, we received orders to 
make a bombing raid. Sixty volunteers were asked for, and the whole battalion offered. I was 
lucky – or unlucky – enough to be among the sixty who were chosen.”
76
 Following his 
statement volunteering for trench raids was probably expected from every soldier, even if they 
did not want to.
77
 Selecting personnel by this method certainly had mixed results. Although 
officers most likely tried to pick soldiers which they considered to be the most skilled for the 
job, this required good knowledge of the talents of every soldier under their command which 
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probably not all officers had. Also probably not all Battalion Commanders were thrilled to 
send their best men into these dangerous missions or were simply inclined to give new 
recruits a chance to prove themselves in an actual combat situation. Such considerations were 
certainly a factor which could influence the results of a trench raid, which occasionally ended 
in a disaster for the participants due to insufficient preparations and inexperienced soldiers 
like a raid which conducted on March 1
st
 1917 at Vimy Ridge in which 77 Canadian trench 
raiders and 6 of their accompanying officers of the 54
th
 Canadian Infantry Battalion lost their 
life during the first five minutes of the operation.
78
 
Extensive specialized training did also play a large role for trench raiders, although 
exercises were only issued temporarily and were mostly focused around the objective. The 
amount of preparation involved in a trench raid however significantly increased from the first 
raid in February 1915 until the ones which were conducted in the last year of the war. The 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Regiment, which claims to have conducted the 
first trench raid during the First World War in the night of February 27
th
-28
th
, had only two 
officers detached, the supposed raiding leaders themselves, to conduct some reconnaissance 
on the selected sector of the German trenches prior to the raid. One of these officers got taken 
prisoner by German soldiers which then subsequently left only one to instruct his raiding 
party for the task.
79
 While this is a clear sign of the ad hoc nature of the first trench raid and 
the distinctive lower echelons adaptability of the Canadian army, preparation became more 
sophisticated in the years to come. Trench raiders would usually construct dummy trenches, 
shaped after the German sector which was to be targeted. Also all volunteers for the raid were 
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excluded from regular trench duties for the time of preparation and the conduction of the 
raid.
80
   
Training methods were therefore one characteristic of trench raiding which arguably 
made the most progress during the war. However there is no evidence that the sophisticated 
techniques trench raiders developed had an impact on their self-perception or the way they 
were perceived by non-trench raiders. Raiding parties were also much in contrast to storm 
battalions only temporarily excluded from regular trench duties for the duration of their 
preparations and the completion of their intended trench raid.
81
 Volunteering and getting 
picked for a trench raid was therefore also possibly considered a way by many Canadians to 
escape the monotony of trench duties and not necessarily an honour itself. When a trench raid 
was over raiders simply returned to their original units, which effectively barred them from 
developing a long lasting self-perception as a non-regular, specialized soldier or even as an 
elite soldier. Sentiment of the latter was only achieved on an individual basis when for 
example medals were awarded to raiders who showed distinctive talent during a trench raid.
82
 
A comparison of the two results reveal that the most striking difference here between both 
formations is the fact that the German storm troopers were deployed in their own battalion 
while Canadian trench raiders were essentially troops drafted from existing infantry 
formations and temporary put into the role of a trench raider. This can also be regarded as one 
of the main reason why storm troopers were able to create a sense of distinction between 
themselves and regular troops. As the Canadian trench raiders were never separated from their 
original units for long but only temporarily for the length of a mission they had a distinctive 
disadvantage in developing an esprit de corps. Canadian soldiers themselves made no 
difference between trench raiders and regular troops as they were not regarded as different 
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formations but just a short-term change in duty. This can be seen as another result of the non-
professional nature of the Canadian forces: They would adapt to the requirements on the 
battlefield for a short time to achieve a certain goal rather than trying to introduce a persistent 
reshape their force structure. As a result, their non-permanent and unidentifiable and shifting 
nature of their force structure left trench raiders with a noticeable disadvantage in creating a 
sense of self as a raider and a distinction between themselves and regular Canadian soldiers. 
This strong contrast in comparison to storm troopers was also even further intensified by the 
fact that trench raiders were picked on a voluntary basis, whereas storm troopers were 
normally picked on basis of their physical fitness and the stress they could endure. Since 
everyone could be a trench raider in the Canadian Army purely by choice, it was near 
impossible for them to develop an esprit de corps as a whole on basis of their force structure 
and the characteristics of their personnel. 
 
 
3. Tactics 
The art of attack from German storm troopers was embedded into larger operations and, as 
this chapter will outline, in contrast to the Canadian trench raiders usually not a task which 
was left exclusively to the storm trooper battalions. According to the Canadian Intelligence 
report on German storm troopers a “Storm battalion is directly under the Army and is 
employed for specially [sic] difficult operations. Infantry are led in attack by them. Storm 
battalions take positions but infantry must hold them.”
83
 Since storm battalions were a new 
introduction to the German Army and their numbers limited, they were intended to be 
exclusively used for specialized assaults against heavily defended targets. As a result storm 
battalions never stayed on one location of the front for long but were sent to whatever sector 
their affiliated army deemed their presence necessary. This also meant that they were often 
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spared from usual duties regular infantry encountered at the front line such as garrison duties, 
patrolling, and maintaining the trenches. As their embedment in combined arms warfare with 
other service branches implies, storm battalions were solely meant to be used as assault 
infantry. Much in contrast to the tactics of Canadian trench raiders which will be highlighted 
later in this chapter, storm troopers were not supposed to be send into an engagement with the 
enemy all by themselves. Although, as outlined in the previous chapter, almost all of the 
German infantry was supposed to be reshaped and retrained in the image of the storm 
troopers, their late introduction to the war and the consequently low numbers of the storm 
battalions made them to valuable to be used under different circumstances. 
As artillery only had the role to suppress the enemy positions and pave a corridor 
through natural obstacles, wires and defences for the advance of the infantry, storm trooper on 
the other hand were the first in these missions to make actual first contact with the enemy 
while regular infantry had only the task to mop up the last existing pockets of resistance 
which the storm troopers had not dealt with during their assault and hold the ground which 
was taken by the storm battalions.
84
 Artillery fire during the assault was less a preliminary 
bombardment but composed as a rolling barrage to which the assaulting infantry closely 
followed in its footsteps. “In the attack, the hostile artillery was to be held down effectively, 
while the infantry was to work its way up close to the place where our artillery projectiles 
fell”
85
, as the German Lieutenant General Wilhelm Balck briefly summarized this approach 
shortly after the war.  
A strategy like this demanded a high level of resistance to stress from the storm 
troopers, since the bombardment of their near vicinity could be equally dangerous for 
themselves as it was for the enemy if they did not pay enough attention. A storm trooper had 
essentially to be able to suppress the impulse to take cover when artillery grenades exploded 
in front of him and press on with the attack: “Our infantry must absolutely rid itself of all 
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nervousness when our own artillery fire strikes close to them. Co-operation between heavy 
and field artillery should be improved. Our artillery fire should be supplemented by 
minenwerfer fire.”
86
 As outlined in the previous chapter storm battalions had their own light 
artillery like minenwerfer to call upon within their ranks in case they needed additional fire 
support against an obstacle in their way or suppress machinegun nests which survived the 
rolling barrage of the heavy artillery: “[…] light trench mortars are placed under the orders of 
each battalion, which thereby becomes a mixed body of infantry, artillery, trench mortars and 
machine guns. This permits the battalion commander to fulfil the duties which fall to his lot 
without outside aid.”
87
 This was most likely a result of the fact that communication between 
assault infantry and heavy artillery to direct the bombardment on certain spots of the 
battlefield again could not be guaranteed during an offensive and would due to the delay only 
hinder the advance.
88
 It essentially gave storm battalions all necessary equipment and also 
consequently all independence during their assault to deal with anything they could encounter 
during the offensive which combined with the stress they had to endure from the German 
artillery’s rolling barrage likely further promoted their self-perception as a dynamic and 
outstanding fighting force. Regular infantry on the other hand, usually called 
“Sicherungstrupps”
89
 (‘covering troops’) by storm troopers, which followed in their footsteps, 
was in this respect less a support unit to the storm battalions and only a means to secure the 
ground storm troopers had gathered and take over and guard prisoners. 
The embedment of storm troopers in the German art of attack after the deployments of 
storm battalions had begun most likely had a good share of influence in developing their 
esprit de corps and their self of sense as an elite force. Their prominent role in the attack as 
                                                 
86
 Ibid. pp. 70. 
87
 US War Department, A Survey of German Tactics, 1918 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918), pp. 
20. 
88
 US War Department, German and Austrian Tactical Studies: Translations of captured German and Austrian 
Documents and Information gained from German and Austrian Prisoners – From the British, French and Italian 
Staffs (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918), pp. 150-152. 
89
 Fehrenbach, Oberleutnant Th., ‘Meine Eindrücke in der 2. württbg. Sturmkp., Sturmbat. 16’, pp. 305. 
 32 
the spearhead of the German Army saw them integrated in the arguably most dangerous part 
during an offensive. In the foreword to the published memoirs of a former storm trooper the 
war volunteer and writer Franz Schauwecker gave a brief description of how storm troopers 
were perceived at the frontlines by regular infantry: “Where the soldiers of the storm 
battalions appeared, fate planted its black flag. Their appearance was always a clear sign that 
a critical decision was made here. The other soldiers […] watched them silently. Everyone 
knew what was going on when they appeared. […] it was their duty to confront the greatest 
danger.”
90
 It should be noted however, that overly heroic tone of Schauwecker’s description is 
certainly much a result of his openly militaristic and nationalistic views he developed in the 
inter war period.
91
 The author of the memoirs Hoeppener-Flatow himself on the other hand 
used a much less heroic tone and bravado to describe his self-perception as a storm trooper 
and his role on the field, though he never actually dismissed the alleged importance of storm 
battalions as the perceived elite force of the German Army.
92
 
Trench raids on the other hand were usually not embedded in a combined arms 
strategy, but remained an infiltration tactic which was solely to be executed by infantry. 
Trench raids were an almost exclusive means of attrition, whose only secondary objective was 
to gather intelligence, either in the form of prisoners or documents, in the enemy sector which 
was to be raided.
93
 “Trench raids are used to cause the enemy casualties, to destroy his trench 
fortifications, and to decrease his morale”
94
, as the handbook on trench fighting summarized 
the task. One striking element of the summary Captain Haws Elliot provided in his handbook 
of 1917 is that it also mentions the secondary objective of trench raiders to find out if 
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“German shock or attack troops”
95
 were in the sector, which is considering the year of 
publication most likely a reference to storm troopers. Although they had not been deployed in 
full force in 1917, it appears that storm troopers were already considered a significant threat 
from Canadian and British perspective which needed to be watched closely. Since raids were 
generally conducted at night, raiders often blackened their faces to camouflage themselves 
and wore soft caps for the duration of the operation instead of steel helmets which were 
introduced later in the war, all means to lower the likelihood of getting discovered by enemy 
sentries when raiders approached their target.
96
 As such trench raids can also be regarded as a 
sort of psychological warfare since German soldiers always had to expect a sudden assault 
during the night, resulting in a state of constant distress which grinded their fatigue as a 
result.
97
 
Although the Canadian Expedition Corps made attempts to continuously increase the 
size of trench raiding parties as the war progressed and support their efforts by other service 
branches like artillery as a means to achieve a higher amount of attrition on the German Army 
in less time, the experiments in embedding trench raiders in a combined arms approach 
ultimately failed. Success of a trench raid more than often relied on its surprise effect on the 
enemy troops and its quick execution before the enemy could deploy a counterattack to repel 
the raiding party.
98
 Artillery, especially used as a means to provide a preliminary 
bombardment, remained therefore an unsuitable weapon for the task as it alerted the enemy. 
Although the Canadian artillery sometimes gave covering fire for returning raiding parties 
who were threatened by an assembling German counterattack, these implementations were 
not an essential part of the raid itself, but more an opportunity which in some cases arose from 
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them.
99
 On some occasions daytime raids were still accompanied by a prelimanery 
bombardment on the enemy sector, but these instances remained very rare and can therefore 
hardly be called an implementation of combined arms warfare.
100
 
Naturally newly introduced weapons like the tank also were incompatible to trench 
raids due to their loudness, their low speed and their tendency to often get stuck in the muddy 
terrain and craters in no-mans-land due to mechanical difficulties.
101
 In this regard trench 
raiders were at a clear disadvantage compared to storm troopers in showing their skills to 
other service branches to promote a clear distinction between them and simultaneously help 
the trench raiders to develop their own sense of self as a unique fighting force. If any 
competition in terms of gaining recognition as skilful soldiers occurred, it remained among 
the raiding parties and did usually not involve other service branches, although competition 
would sometimes spread from trench raiders of the Canadian Expedition Corps to the ones 
deployed by the British Expedition Force: “Battalion competed with battalion, brigade with 
brigade, division with division, in accomplishing the biggest raid. Soon, too, competition 
came from outside. When we had reached the figure of one hundred prisoners and one 
machine-gun in a raid, news came from the Ypres salient that the British regiments there had 
succeeded in taking one hundred and twenty prisoners and two machine-guns. There was no 
envy, but there was very general determination to beat that figure.”
102
 Trench raiders kept 
very close to themselves and their essentially non-existing embedment into a larger combined 
arms tactic can be only one explanation for this conspicuous outcome. 
Canadian trench raiders used distinctive methods in their operations to achieve their 
goal. Since trench raids were a means of attritional warfare and therefore first and foremost 
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meant to frequently cause considerable losses to the enemy and reduce their overall moral, the 
very nature of their task likely influenced their self-perception and the way trench raiders 
were perceived by others.
103
 Taking prisoners however was only one way to reduce the 
numbers of the enemy. Letters and war memoirs of former trench raiders in the Canadian 
army regularly describe episodes during raids in which the raiders showed absolutely no 
mercy to the garrison they found, including German soldiers who actively tried to surrender. 
“A Canadian private, having penetrated a German trench with an attacking party, encountered 
a German who threw up his hands and said: “Mercy, Kamerade [sic]. I have a wife and five 
children at home.” “You're mistaken,” replied the Canadian. “You have a widow and five 
orphans at home.” And, very shortly, he had”
104
, as Sergeant McClintock of the 87
th
 battalion 
of the Canadian Grenadier Guards described his first trench raid in his memoirs. In another 
raid in the Somme area near the town Courcelette a Canadian participant expressed in a letter 
to his wife that he and his soldiers gave no quarter to the German defenders: “I went true all 
the fights the same as if I was making logs I baynetted [sic] some killed others. […] when 
they [the Germans] saw they were beaten they put up their hands up but dear wife it was to 
[sic] late as long as I leave I’ll remember it.”
105
 The underaged Canadian Private James 
Hector Owen, who lied about his age to military authorities to get enlisted and embarked to 
France, had similar experiences in combat when it came to the treatment of surrendering 
Germans. In a letter addressed to his mother he described the behaviour of one of his own 
brothers who both fought alongside him in the 15
th
 battalion: “A German […] had chickened 
out and tried to surrender. Our boy would have none of it. He lunged at the German again and 
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again, who each time lowered his arms and stopped the point of the bayonet with his bare 
hands. The German was screaming for mercy. Oh God, it was brutal!”
106
 
Some of these accounts read like they were just a result of enraged soldiers in the heat 
of battle who sought revenge for their fallen comrades.
107
 However these are just a few 
examples for these brutal incidents which are featured in many letters, war memoirs and post-
war interviews of Canadian soldiers.
108
 Other accounts of these incidents show that they were 
not always included in fierce battle but happened when they already had ended. “I had them 
[the German prisoners] covered with the officer’s revolver and made ‘em open their pockets 
without turning round. Then I dropped a Mills bomb in each, with the pin out, and ducked 
behind a traverse. Bang, bang, bang! No more bloody prisoners. No good Fritzes but dead 
‘uns”
109
, a former Canadian trench raider reported after the war how he killed three German 
prisoners. In the published letters of Lieutenant Colonel Agar Adamson of the Princess 
Patricia’s Light Infantry there is one incident being described where a German officer who 
had previously surrendered was shot because he had demanded to be guarded by a Canadian 
officer of his rank. The raiders decided this would be too bothersome and killed him where he 
stood.
110
 Another incident in June 1916 featured a Canadian machine gunner who killed off a 
group of unarmed and surrendering German soldiers who had slowly approached the position 
the Canadians held.
111
 
Official documents and war diaries of the different battalions of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force on the other hand remain silent on this subject. This is not exactly 
surprising considering that these acts were condemned by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
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1907.
112
 Although Canada did not sign the convention by herself with a delegation of her 
own, the United Kingdom however did so on behalf of the British Empire.
113
 Canada as a 
Dominion within the British Empire could as a result still be arguably held accountable for 
these acts as a subordinate state of one of the major signing members of the Hague 
Conventions. It could be argued that the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were possibly 
redundant anyway due to the widespread usage of gas from all nations, including from the 
Canadian artillery, which was also officially condemned by the agreement. However these 
incidents precede in some cases the introduction of gas warfare on the Western Front on April 
22
nd
 1915.
114
   
As the Canadian historian Tim Cook points out, who has so far written the most 
detailed account on this subject in regard to the Canadian Expeditionary Force, the killing of 
prisoners was not an entirely uncommon sight on the Western Front and occurred among 
soldiers of all participating nations.
115
 The vast number of evidence from letters and memoirs 
however suggests that these brutal deeds were much more frequent among Canadians, 
especially during trench raids.
116
 Due to the distinctively high regularity of these occurrences 
in trench raids they can not be simply disposed as random acts of cruelty on behalf of the 
trench raiders. Prisoners were in many cases regarded as the primary measurement of success 
for a trench raid, since they represented an ample and visible figure of the reduction of the 
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enemy fighting force.
117
 It therefore appears to be illogical that trench raiders would often 
actively dispose prisoners instead of using them as a means for gaining recognition of their 
success. Tim Cook stresses the possibility that these atrocious acts of Canadian trench raiders 
were essentially operations driven by vengeance which was stirred by Canadian propaganda 
and simply aimed to make German soldiers at least pay equally in human lives for all the dead 
a Canadian formation had suffered in its sector.
118
  
This however does not explain why these acts were so prominent with the Canadian 
trench raiders and a lot less frequent within other nations although those also regularly 
suffered heavy casualties. It could be argued that the comparatively less thorough pre war drill 
of Canadian soldiers was responsible that they were more likely to give in to such violent 
actions. Since drill played a large part on a soldier’s discipline and how soldiers performed in 
battle, this could have also had an effect on the way they treated surrendering enemy 
soldiers.
119
 On the other hand this can be only partly responsible as there is no evidence that 
Canadian soldiers kept their lower pre war standards in training during the war. At least some 
Canadian trench raiders seemed to feel that they had to expect an equal violent treatment if 
they would fall into the hands of German soldiers. “Lots of our poor chaps were wounded in 
the trench, and had to be left behind in the retreat. We know what they got”
120
 a Canadian 
soldier shared in his memoirs, strongly implying that the German soldiers killed off all the 
wounded men the Canadians left behind during an unsuccessful attack on a German trench on 
May 5
th
 1915. However this was just an assumption on his behalf. He could not possibly 
know what happened to his comrades. It therefore remains unclear where this general 
sentiment originated from. Influence from propaganda and rumours among soldiers could be a 
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possibility. There are no existing sources to be found though which could give a definite 
answer to this question. 
A more suitable answer for these reoccurring incidents during trench raids lies 
arguably in the tactics of trench raiders and the way they were deployed. As outlined in a 
previous paragraph trench raids heavily relied on a stealthy approach of the raiding party and 
quick execution before German forces in the area could deploy a counterattack. Raids would 
also often be launched at night or during the first hours of the day. Naturally the surprise 
effect on the German garrisons in the front trenches would often leave them unable to stage an 
effective defence against the sudden Canadian assault and would as a result make many 
German soldiers prone to surrender immediately rather than fighting against an enemy who 
clearly had the initiative. In letters Canadian trench raiders often mention that especially 
during night raids they regularly encountered German soldiers who were not even fully 
dressed, yet alone armed. “We took the Hun so much by surprise that some of them had no 
trousers on”
121
, Lieutenant C.B.F. Jones stated in one of his letters in which he described his 
first trench raid on April 9
th
 1917.   
A raiding party presumably often had a distinctive chance to quickly overwhelm any 
resistance and subsequently create a large number of German prisoners of war in very short 
time. Due to the fact that the number of prisoners was often equal to the number of Canadian 
soldiers in the raiding party or even surpassed them, a high proportion of raiders had to be 
deployed as guards of the prisoners and had to accompany them through no-man’s-land back 
to the Canadian trenches.
122
 This would as a result diminish the fighting power of the 
remaining raiding party and severely hinder them to continue with their mission to destroy the 
enemy fortifications. Furthermore it was often a dangerous and lengthy process to lead the 
captured prisoners back, especially during raids at night. Raiders themselves had to find or 
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create small openings in the barbed wire defences set up in front of the German trenches.
123
 
Leading prisoners through these small gaps, especially larger numbers, naturally resulted in a 
long trail of German soldiers wandering through no-man’s-land under custody of Canadian 
raiders, something the raiding party could not always afford to do. “The number of men 
required to herd them back to the P.O.W. cages could not be spared”
124
, Victor Wheeler noted 
in his memoirs when he described a raid at Vimy Ridge in which the raiding party he was part 
of made so many prisoners that they decided to kill most of them instead of sending them 
back under guard. 
Disposing prisoners was therefore possibly a safer route for trench raiders since they 
could then keep their mobility.
125
 Leaving German soldiers behind in their own trenches was 
not an option as they could have picked up weapons again and started shooting at the 
retreating raiders when they had finished their work. Furthermore the process of taking 
prisoners was often dangerous itself due to common misunderstandings between the 
individuals involved or simply because of feigned surrenders in which the captors would be 
captured themselves.
126
 Also this option would have entirely contradicted the essence of 
attritional warfare due to the fact it was aimed to reduce the enemy fighting power my all 
means. The existing evidence strongly implies that many trench raiders took this literally and 
essentially did not care as much for the regulations on the treatment of prisoners of war as 
they did with their task and of course their own safety. “The purpose of war is to exterminate 
the enemy”
127
 as one Canadian soldier put it in a letter to his father. This general mindset is 
even mentioned in the personal handbook on offensive actions in trench warfare of the 
Canadian Major Donald McRae in which he stated that “a raiding party shows no mercy and 
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after taking one or two prisoners kills all other enemy it can”
128
 and “a raid is supposed to be a 
merciless affair, and all enemy encountered after two or three prisoners are taken should be 
killed. One of the main reasons Canadian raids are so successful is that Germans know that 
they get no mercy and often lose their nerve and try to get away.”
129
 In conclusion the 
executions of prisoners were no accidents by enraged soldiers who were under influence by 
their countries war propaganda, like Tim Cook argues, but an essential part of trench raiding. 
Propaganda was in this regard only a supplement which made these deeds more bearably and 
sustainable for the soldiers due to their depersonalising depicture of the enemy.
130
  
As these acts were essentially war crimes it is not surprising that trench raiders would 
feel the need to seclude themselves from other service branches and compete and distinguish 
successes only among their own kind instead of seeking recognition as an effective fighting 
force in attritional warfare. This also includes direct acknowledgement from home. Although 
the reactions of their relatives to which their personal letters were directed are not entirely 
clear, it is safe to assume that they must have been appalled by the brutality included in these 
raids their sons, fathers or husbands told them about and in many cases participated in. Due to 
the high number of evidence on these acts they can hardly be called a secret. They certainly 
influenced the way trench raiders were perceived both within their army structures and at 
home. Although their respective families and superiors in the army shied away to condemn 
these acts publicly, they still remained silent on the matter and did not try to stop them, which 
as a result also effectively made these violent actions also more likely to reoccur.
131
 That 
these acts were widely known but were kept under a strict silence can also be proven by an 
entry from November 1918 in the diary of the Commander in Chief of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force General Arthur Currie who stated that “it was not the intention of our 
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fellows to take many German prisoners”
132
, by which he essentially confirmed that he knew 
of these acts all along. 
The strict silence is also reflected in the fact that post war published collections of 
letters from Canadian trench raiders usually do not contain any remarks in regard to 
mistreatment or killings of prisoners, while unpublished letters in contrast often do. In ‘Letters 
from the Front’ for example prisoners are always treated in accordance to the Hague 
Conventions, except in one occasion in which the author of the letter mentions as a side note 
that almost no prisoners were taken in one raid he participated in. However this incident is 
embedded in fierce fighting: “The wood seemed to be literally lined with machine guns, and 
they played these guns on us with terrible effect. Our men were dropping thick and fast. 
However, those remaining sailed right ahead and cleared the wood with a vengeance. A few 
'Huns' were taken prisoners, but damned few. We had enough to do to take care of ourselves 
and our own wounded to bother about prisoners.”
133
 The reason this letter was chosen for 
publication was most likely the fact that the incident seems harmless as it looks like a 
somewhat fair reaction in the sense of biblical ‘an eye for an eye’ justice.  
Although the Canadian society largely followed the silence of the army officials on the 
subject of killing prisoners, one prominent account of criticism does exist. The English poet 
Robert Graves, who served as an officer in the British Expeditionary Force in France, heavily 
condemned the acts of Canadian trench raiders in his book ‘Goodbye to all that’ which was 
published a decade after the First World War had ended: “The troops with the worst 
reputation for acts of violence against prisoners were the Canadians. […] The Canadians’ 
motive was said to be revenge for a Canadian found crucified with bayonets through his hands 
and feet in a German trench. […] At all events, most overseas men, and some British troops, 
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made atrocities against prisoners a boast, not a confession.”
134
 Like Tim Cook Robert Graves 
stresses the influence of propaganda and the unpredictable behaviour of soldiers in battle as 
the source of these acts, but as pointed out earlier this is hardly a convincing explanation of 
why especially Canadians would be so highly susceptible to both.
135
 With the last sentence 
Graves presumably refers to the habit of trench raiders to compete among themselves for the 
most outstanding successes in attritional warfare. Since everyone could be a trench raider by 
just volunteering for the task, this habit was probably very widespread in the front lines and 
could be encountered almost everywhere in the sectors held by Canadian troops. 
Since the frequent killings of unarmed and surrendering Germans however hardly fit 
into the picture of outstanding and exemplary soldiers, this sentiment most likely also had its 
share in the outcome of their perception. Killing prisoners is naturally unsuitable to have a 
positive impact on perception and most trench raiders most likely knew that due to the fact 
that they felt the need to isolate themselves and sought recognition only among their own 
kind. Only to them they would feel to share their successes on the field. Canadian trench 
raiders were in this regard again struck with a definite disadvantage in gaining acceptance as 
an exemplary elite force in comparison to storm troopers. Their tactics often brought them 
into a position in which they had to decide against taking prisoners because it could bring 
their own safety at risk in some situations. Although storm troopers also had individuals in 
their ranks who frequently killed surrendering enemy soldiers, as Ernst Jünger points out in 
his memoirs, these acts never developed into a necessity within their tactics as it did with for 
the trench raiders.
136
 Overall only few cases are known in which German soldiers actively 
executed surrendering enemy troops during the First World War.
137
 
                                                 
134
 Graves, Robert, Goodbye to all that, pp. 154. 
135
 For Tim Cook’s interpretation of the influence of propaganda on Canadian soldiers see: Cook, Tim, 
‘Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great War’, pp. 652. 
136
 For Jünger’s comment on the subject of killing prisoners see: Jünger Ernst, In Stahlgewittern,  388. 
Interestingly the sentences in which he condemned these incidents were removed in the last edition of his book. 
See: Jünger, Ernst, Storm of Steel, pp. 239. 
137
 Holmes, Richard, Firing Line, pp. 382. 
 44 
Storm battalions had the advantage that their role was embedded in a combat of 
movement while trench raiders were exclusively fighting a war of attrition on their own. 
Successfully fighting for territory in a stalemate however is generally a more accepted method 
of gaining a good reputation as a soldier than by just creating a large number of enemy 
casualties. 
 
 
4. Institutional Support and Equipment 
The institutional support storm troopers received is heavily reflected in their equipment. As 
outlined in their force structure in the second chapter of this research storm battalions featured 
companies within their ranks for specialized tasks. Light infantry guns to suppress enemies in 
their trenches as well as flamethrower teams to effectively destroy enemy resistance at short 
range had their place in a storm battalion. Furthermore storm troopers were allowed to wear 
the guard insignias of the Imperial Guard, the former alleged elite force of the German army, 
which most likely further boosted the confidence of the personnel of storm battalions in 
perceiving themselves as the new elite of the German army.
138
 The reason for this fine 
equipment of storm troopers lies within the fact that they had convinced higher levels in the 
German army of their effectiveness in combat during their testing phase in 1916, including 
Quartermaster General Erich von Ludendorff who was the main supporter behind the idea to 
make storm battalions the role model of future German infantry.
139
 Considering this plan it 
seems illogical that higher echelons had allowed storm troopers to wear guard insignias, since 
they were not supposed to be a special force for long.  
On the other hand this action was presumably a temporary solution until the rest of the 
German infantry had been retrained and redeployment as storm troopers. This is also true in 
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other regards. The German army and the German War Ministry followed a distinct campaign 
to promote storm troopers as the new role model of the German infantry and embedded them 
in propaganda even before the process of the deployment of storm battalions was completed. 
The German War Bonds campaign in 1917 for example was advertised with a propaganda 
poster which showed a storm trooper in his full gear, complete with steel helmet, a gasmask, a 
sack filled with stick hand grenades and the insignia of the Imperial Guard on his collar.
140
 
Furthermore the text on the poster says ‘Help us triumph!’ which could be both interpreted as 
a line for the German army as a whole or, considering the picture exclusively features a storm 
trooper, a distinct promotion of Germany’s new alleged war winning formation on the 
battlefield.  
The depiction of storm troopers in German propaganda also followed the general 
outlet of other late war propaganda posters, which frequently stressed the resemblance of 
storm troopers with medieval knights thanks to their steel helmet.
141
 This sentiment was also 
picked up by field newspapers like the ‘Die Wacht im Westen’ of the German 1
st
 Army: “The 
knights of the middle ages had very similar helmets, and are they not looking defiant, strong 
and powerful to us?”
142
  Although all German soldiers received a steel helmet during the last 
two years of the war, storm battalions were among the first to be fully outfitted with them.
143
 
The embedment of German soldiers in propaganda as some sort of reborn chivalry was 
therefore, at least for a while, entirely directed at storm troopers. 
Although not always combined with propaganda posters, other field newspapers also 
highlighted the importance of the new storm battalions. In their descriptions storm troopers 
are usually depicted as determined and stoic, but also very godly soldiers who recite psalms 
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when they march into battle and do not care about women if they happen to meet one behind 
the front lines.
144
 Combined with their depiction as knights in propaganda posters, their 
propagandistic description very much gives storm troopers a lose similarity to the medieval 
military orders of the Knights Templar or the Teutonic Knights since these were essentially 
warrior monks and had their members swear vows of chastity.  
However this very propagandistic depiction of storm troopers was not always kept in 
field newspapers. Usually the texts of German field newspapers of 1917 and 1918 rather 
stayed true to a more modest description of storm troopers, although they still frequently 
praised their combat abilities. Furthermore they sometimes featured noteworthy combat 
situations of storm battalions in exclusive articles. The field newspaper of the army group B 
for example highlighted remarkable deeds of her storm troopers under the heading 
‘Ehrentafel’ (‘roll of honour’).
145
 This practice however is can not be always found in all field 
newspapers. Other field newspapers often rather included such events in their columns on 
current war events, although they still usually made sure to highlight the presence of storm 
battalions in a battle to underline their alleged significance.
146
 The more descriptive and 
modest nature of the majority of articles was most likely influenced by the fact that this 
method was approachable to the audience. Since the readers were soldiers themselves it was 
probably more sensible to feature somewhat realistic events instead of exaggerated 
propaganda. 
Official photographs of Canadian soldiers at the front lines and propaganda posters of 
all sorts on the other hand, be it for recruiting, war bonds or donations, never exclusively 
depicted soldiers which could be identified as trench raiders but normally showed Canadian 
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soldiers in their regular uniforms and standardized equipment.
147
 In Canadian propaganda and 
trench newspapers individual successes were praised instead of whole formations.
148
 This is 
most likely a result of the nature of the force structure of trench raiders since they effectively 
remained regular infantry in their organisation and were only deployed temporarily for the 
length of a mission, very much in contrast to storm battalions which formed a constant 
formation on their own. In comparison to each other storm troopers were much better 
embedded in propaganda. Furthermore field newspapers regularly informed all service 
branches of German army of their engagements with the enemy, even when just a small 
number of soldiers were involved. Canadian trench newspapers on the other hand had a 
stronger emphasis to provide entertainment to their readership instead of promoting role 
models for the army like their German counterparts. 
Another huge discrepancy between the two formations existed in the matter of 
specialized equipment. Canadian trench raiders were not given any special equipment like 
Germans storm troopers but had to make due with the gear regular infantry received in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force. To prepare themselves for their task they had even more than 
storm troopers to rely on self made weapons. Trench raider often shortened the barrel of their 
rifles by simply sawing it off to turn it into a shorter, almost pistol like weapon, since real 
pistols were not as widespread among the lower ranks that made up the majority of trench 
raiders.
149
 “If possible, ‘sawed off’ rifles, with bayonet studs, are used, as they make a very 
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handy trench weapon and fire accurately enough for the close-range shooting in a bay”
150
, the 
Canadian Major Donald McRae noted in his handbook when he addressed usual equipment in 
trench raids. Makeshift trench clubs, a mace-like weapon which generally consisted of a stick 
with a metal head, often made from an outer hull of an egg grenade or other scrap metal, were 
another weapon commonly found in the front lines and used by trench raiders.
151
 Trench clubs 
quickly became a common sight among raiders since their rifles, especially with a bayonet 
attached to them, were often considered an unreliable weapon for hand to hand combat in the 
rather enclosed environment of entrenchments.
152
 Considering that trench raiders often 
followed the practice to kill German prisoners when they considered them to be too 
cumbersome, these trench clubs presumably made the deed particularly gruesome. These 
often rather uncivilised and crude looking weapons possibly had their share of influence in the 
trench raiders attitude to seclude themselves and in formulating their reputation and 
perception from others.  
The fact that trench raiders had to produce much of their own weaponry out of 
common infantry equipment, wooden sticks and scrap metal speaks for itself how much they 
were neglected in regard to institutional support from home. Although storm troopers too had 
to overcome shortages in their equipment, especially in regard to larger explosives, the 
German War ministry at least supported their efforts in publishing a manual for producing a 
variety of explosives with the standard German stick hand grenade and basic tools commonly 
found at the front line.
153
  
Although especially the first trench raid in February 1915 generated much 
acknowledgement and praise from higher levels of both the Canadian and British army for the 
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adaptability of the Canadian infantry at the front line, this did not made way for a specialized 
program to support them.
154
 The reason for this was that these congratulations were more an 
expression of the higher echelons to admire the fact that Canadian soldiers were actively 
trying to break the ‘live and let live’ system of trench warfare which often came outside of 
planned offensives and sometimes even resulted in attempts of fraternisation from soldiers of 
both sides in some sectors of the front.
155
 Such events were deeply despised by higher ranks 
and trench raids were therefore seen as an adequate and effective method to keep troops at the 
front lines busy.
156
 Furthermore the British Commander in Chief General Haig officially 
rejected the idea of winning through attrition in January 1916, which was presumably part of 
the reason why the idea of trench raiding lost significance in the view of higher echelons in 
both the Canadian and British Expeditionary Forces.
157
 
Only one attempt was made by Canadian General David Watson to permanently 
implement another service branch into trench raiding tactics. Since regular artillery grenades 
proved to be unsuitable in regard to preliminary bombardments since they alerted the sector 
which was to be raided, the use of poison gas was considered as a short term means to 
suppress and inflict heavy casualties on the enemy right before the assault of the raiders.
158
 
The initial test of this idea on March 1st 1917 however resulted in a huge failure with lots of 
Canadian casualties.
159
 The idea of supporting trench raids by any means was then 
immediately cancelled and trench raids remained continued to be an all infantry operation for 
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the remainder of the war.
160
 If this particular raid would have been successful a continued 
more streamlined effort from higher echelons of the Canadian Expeditionary Force would 
have been very likely. Since the raid however ended in a disaster it also ultimately ended the 
process of institutionalized support before it had barely begun. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This dissertation has investigated how the geographical and military cultural origin, the force 
structure, tactics on the battlefield as well as the degree of received institutional support 
influenced the perception and self-perception of trench raiders and storm troopers, the 
specialized assault units of Canada and Germany in the First World War. The hypothesis 
posed at the beginning of this study stated that storm troopers perceived themselves as an elite 
unit in the German army while Canadian trench raiders did not, although they were similar in 
the way of a small unit assault force. This study set out to determine how differences of both 
formations in the categories stated above influenced the way their members perceived 
themselves and how they were viewed by other service branches and their respective people 
in their home countries. 
The results of this investigation show that the emergence of storm battalions in the 
German Army was a systematic process which was initiated by officers within the army with 
direct support by both their superiors and the German War Ministry, while trench raiding was 
arguably a result of the adaptability of Canadian soldiers and their lower standards in pre war 
drills and training methods, which subsequently introduced a lose sense of decentralised 
command in lower echelons in the way of having troops at the front lines looking for own 
solutions when faced with a challenge. As a result Canadian soldiers frequently turned 
situations in their favour where more thoroughly trained troops from other nations had failed 
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due to outdated tactics. Since the Canadian adaptability and the subsequent emergence of 
trench raiders however were a result of their lower ranks which often went barely noticed by 
the high echelons of the Canadian Expedition Force and the Canadian War Ministry, the 
methods of conducting trench raids barely changed throughout the war due to the lack of 
support. Trench raiding remained an ad hoc operation which was usually launched to keep the 
enemy busy and to force a constant war of attrition upon him outside of large allied 
offensives. 
Due to the nature of trench raiding Canadian raiders never had the chance to develop a 
distinctive sense of self as an elite force within the Canadian Expeditionary Force. The 
frequent incidents in trench raids in which the attacking raiding party killed German prisoners 
certainly had a major share in this outcome. Since the essence of trench raid tactics was a 
quickly executed assault on an unwary enemy trench sector and the fact that raiders often 
captured during this process more prisoners than they could effectively guard and accompany 
back to their own trenches, they often had no choice but to dispose the majority of the 
prisoners they had taken. Although these acts can be essentially seen as war crimes, they were 
in fact normally not more than a necessity to guarantee the raiding party’s own safety. 
Leaving the German prisoners behind was not an option because they could easily pick up 
weapons again when the raiding party left their sector. Also this would have contradicted the 
essence of attritional warfare and since all nations involved in the war essentially broke the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 at least occasionally on certain occasions, the trench 
raiders habit to dispose prisoners was presumably not seen as such a huge issue.  
Still, these acts had of course backlashes on the raiders own self-perception and the 
way they were perceived by others. Trench raiders usually kept to themselves and highlighted 
their successes on the field only to other raiders, presumably because they believed only other 
raiders could understand what they went through. High echelons of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force however remained largely silent on the matter of trench raids. They were 
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either not large enough in scale to be of significant notice to them or they simply did not want 
to shed to much light on the essence of how trench raids were conducted. This peculiar silence 
was also largely kept in Canadian society after the First World War had ended. Since Canada 
was on the victorious side of the war the likelihood of criticizing the behaviour of her 
returning soldiers was absent and naturally more effort was put into celebrating the victory. It 
is therefore not surprising that criticism on trench raiders was launched from an Englishman 
after the war and did not have its origin in Canadian society. The account of Robert Graves 
however remained the only distinctive condemnation of the tactics of Canadian trench raiders 
in the inter war period. Furthermore this particular silence in Canada on this subject was most 
likely also further influenced by the particular non-military minded Canadian culture which 
largely ignored military affairs in peacetime. 
The early and consistent support storm troopers received from higher echelons on the 
other hand definitely helped them to a great extent in formulating their reputation as the new 
elite force of the German Army, since so many resources were directed to them for the 
training and deployment of the new storm battalions. Furthermore their embedment into 
German tactics on the Western Front, particularly in the German spring offensive, promoted 
storm battalions into the prominent role of the German spearhead in a combined arms assault. 
Their thorough training methods, their relief of regular trench duties as well as the 
comparatively high standards in recruiting personnel for the storm battalions further 
encouraged storm troopers to develop a self-perception of alleged superiority in comparison 
to other service branches of the German Army. Since storm trooper tactics were not 
exclusively meant as a means of attrition the members of storm battalions had a definite 
advantage in gaining their alleged elite status in comparison to trench raiders. Due to their 
role on the battlefield storm troopers could be reassured that they were following the usual 
tasks of a soldier in battle. Although killings of prisoners were not entirely absent in storm 
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battalions, as Ernst Jünger noted in his memoirs, there is no evidence that these acts ever 
became a frequent necessity like in the conduct of trench raids. 
The strong embedment of the army in German culture and society in the first half of 
the 20
th
 century furthermore provided former storm troopers like Ernst Jünger and Ludwig 
Renn with a large audience who showed interest in reading their war memoirs. As a result 
storm troopers had a chance of further promoting themselves or at least inform a large 
readership of their war experiences, while there is no evidence that Canadian trench raiders 
ever incited such an interest in Canada. The fact that it took almost one century until Canadian 
historians started to shed some light on the subject of their specialized assault unit in the First 
World War speaks for itself. 
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